and joint evaluation modes. To examine preferences across joint and separate decision modes, I collect data from everyday consumers behaving in a competitive marketplace-the sportscard market. The sportscard marketplace is a natural setting for an examination of preferences, as it provides a rich pool of subjects making decisions in a familiar environment. In addition, it provides a natural variation across individual levels of expertise. I make use of this variation by conducting some of the treatments with professional dealers and others with ordinary consumers. The design was used to capture the distinction between those consumers that have intense market experience (dealers) and those that have less market experience (nondealers). Finally, as I have argued elsewhere (e.g., List, 2001), a major advantage of this particular field experimental design is that my laboratory is the marketplace: subjects would be engaging in similar activities whether I attended the sportscard show or went fishing. In this sense, I am gathering data in the least obtrusive way possible while still maintaining the necessary control to execute a clean comparison between treatments.
and joint evaluation modes. To examine preferences across joint and separate decision modes, I collect data from everyday consumers behaving in a competitive marketplace-the sportscard market. The sportscard marketplace is a natural setting for an examination of preferences, as it provides a rich pool of subjects making decisions in a familiar environment. In addition, it provides a natural variation across individual levels of expertise. I make use of this variation by conducting some of the treatments with professional dealers and others with ordinary consumers. The design was used to capture the distinction between those consumers that have intense market experience (dealers) and those that have less market experience (nondealers). Finally, as I have argued elsewhere (e.g., List, 2001), a major advantage of this particular field experimental design is that my laboratory is the marketplace: subjects would be engaging in similar activities whether I attended the sportscard show or went fishing. In this sense, I am gathering data in the least obtrusive way possible while still maintaining the necessary control to execute a clean comparison between treatments.
The experimental results are sharp. Comparing behavior from more than 240 subjects valuing private commodity bundles, I find a tendency for preferences to reverse: while juxtaposed, the superior bundle is consistently valued more highly, yet in isolation the inferior bundle is preferred-a "more is less" result.2 The results are robust across choice and price elicitations, as well as experienced and inexperienced consumers, although the magnitude of the effect is significantly attenuated for superexperienced consumers. In a normative sense, these results suggest that individual preferences 2 The astute reader will notice the similarities of my study with the work of, for example, Max Bazerman, Christopher Hsee, George Loewenstein, and their respective associates. Later I compare and contrast my study to these psychology studies. 1636 in a risk-free environment may not typically be stable and well defined. Accordingly, these findings should influence the extensive literature that has concentrated on finding nonexpected utility resolutions to paradoxes of choice.
From a policy perspective, these results merit serious consideration in several circles. One particularly important area concerns benefitcost analysis-since President Reagan's 1981 Executive Order 12291, federal agencies are required to consider both the benefits and costs of regulations prior to their implementation. While economists have long measured the benefits and costs of private goods routinely bought and sold in the marketplace, a much more difficult task faces the researcher interested in estimating the benefits of increased air and water quality, for example. Two very distinct methodologies are currently used to estimate the total value of nonmarket goods and services: (i) dichotomous choice questions, wherein the good or service under consideration is valued in isolation, and (ii) choice-based methods, wherein the economic agent selects the most preferred alternative from a set of choices. Thus, with the proper presentation of attributes, these two institutions could yield opposite policy recommendations. Since benefit-cost analysis remains the central paradigm used throughout the public sector, the results herein indicate that much more attention should be paid to the development of consistent approaches for estimating the benefits and costs of public programs.3 Several other policy implications are readily apparent-from optimal government spending programs to choosing efficient regulatory regimes.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section I outlines the experimental design and provides a brief background of related studies. Section II describes the experimental findings. Section III concludes.
I. Experimental Design
The field experiment was carried out on the floor of a sportscard show in a large southwest-ern city. Each participant's experience typically followed three steps: (1) inspection of the goods, (2) learning the rules and placing a bid, and (3) conclusion of the transaction. In Step 1, a potential subject approached the experimenter's table and inquired about the sale of the baseball cards displayed on the table. The experimenter then invited the potential subject to take about five minutes to participate in an auction or consider the purchase of their most preferred choice (depending on treatment type-see description of treatments below). If the subject accepted the invitation, then she was randomly allocated into one of four treatments.4
In treatment IS (IS denotes inferior, separate), I auctioned off 10 1982 Topps professionally graded baseball cards. Each of the 10 cards was graded near mint/mint, and the 10-card bundle had a book value of approximately $15. In treatment SS (SS denotes superior, separate), I auctioned off a bundle of 13 cards: the identical 10 Topps baseball cards and an additional 3 different 1982 baseball cards that were professionally graded to be in "poor" condition-the worst grade possible. While the 3 additional cards are of much lower quality than the original 10 cards, they do have economic value: in aggregate, the 13-card bundle had a book value of approximately $18.
In the third treatment, denoted treatment J, I auctioned off the exact same two bundles side by side. Accordingly, each subject submits two bids, one for each commodity bundle. To provide comparable budget sets across the three treatments, I informed subjects in treatment J that if they were deemed winners of both auctions, a random coin toss would determine which auction was binding. Finally, to provide an explicit link to the extant preference reversal literature cited above (e.g., Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968), and provide insights into behavior over choices, I ran a fourth treatment, treatment C, in which market participants simply paid me $5 and chose their most preferred bundle (rather than bidding in an auction). Table 1 summarizes the 2 X 3 experimental design. In
Step 2, the subject learned the allocation rules. In the auction treatments, I used the random nth-price auction as the allocation institution. As described in List and Jason F. Shogren (1998), the random nth-price auction can be characterized by four simple steps: (1) each bidder submits a bid; (2) each bid is rankordered from lowest to highest; (3) the monitor selects a random number (n) uniformly distributed between 2 and Z (Z bidders); and (4) the monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the (n -1) highest bidders at the nth price. Akin to Vickrey's second-price auction, the random nth-price auction is theoretically incentive compatible. And, given its potential to include every participant in the market, it has an ability to engage bidders even if they believe they are not near the upper tail of the value distribution. Appendix A provides the general instructions for the random nth-price auctions.
After learning the auction rules, the subject placed her bid. Finally, in Step 3 the experimenter: (i) asked the subject to complete a short survey, which provided demographic data on each subject (see Appendix B for a copy of the survey), and (ii) concluded the experiment by informing the subject that she should return at 6 P.M. on Sunday to find out the results of the auction. Subjects were informed that if they could not return for the specified transaction time, they would be contacted and would receive their cards in the mail (postage paid by the experimenter) within three days of receipt of payment.
Before proceeding to the results summary, I should mention a few noteworthy aspects of the experimental design. First, no subject participated in more than one treatment. Second, if the individual agreed to participate, then she could pick up and visually examine each card (in sealed cardholders, with the grade clearly marked). The experimenter worked one-on-one with the participant, and imposed no time limit on her inspection of the cards. Third, in the nondealer treatments, the treatment type was changed at the top of each hour; hence subjects' treatment type was determined based on the time they visited the To the best of my knowledge, however, the current study is the first to examine the more is less conjecture in an actual marketplace with real transactions, where subjects endogenously enter the marketplace and self-select into their roles as experienced or inexperienced consumers. Indeed, as aforementioned, one major advantage of field experiments is that I am observing the natural behavior of subjects in a familiar marketplace. I believe that empirical assessments of this sort complement laboratory exercises and are a necessary link in the conversion of theory and empirical evidence into optimal policy-making. Table 2 contains a summary of the experimental data. In total, I observed decisions of 241 subjects: 130 nondealers and 111 dealers. The top panel in Table 2 presents the nondealer data and what readily emerges is a seemingly anomalous result: on average nondealers bid $4.86 for the 10-card bundle and only $3.06 for the 13-card bundle, a difference of approximately 37 percent. This difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level using a large-sample t-test (t = 2.03). Statistical results from a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of treatment differences, which is a standard nonparametric test that has a null hypothesis of no treatment effect, or that the two samples are derived from identical populations, also suggest that the distributions observed in treatments IS and SS are statistically different at the p < 0.05 level (z = 2.47). This result implies that the 10-card bid distribution is located to the right of the 13-card bid distribution-a more is less result.
II. Experimental Results
Moving down Table 2 to treatment J, I find evidence that suggests preferences reverse across decision modes: the 10-card bundle's mean bid is $3.72 whereas the 13-card bundle's mean bid is $4.52, a difference of approximately 20 percent. And, using both a matched- While these results are stark, and quite surprising to observe in a mature market setting, a commentator could contend that if a fundamental more is less preference reversal exists, it should prevail regardless of the level of subject experience. This concern is notable since, as aforementioned, some studies suggest that preference reversals in risky decisions can be eradicated in market settings (e.g., Chu and Chu, 1990 (List, 2001) . In this regard, the more is less preference reversal may merely be a mistake, and might disappear if subjects gain marketlike experience. The bottom panel of Table 2 contains a summary of the dealer data. Even in this subject pool, which could reasonably be considered "super-experienced" consumers, I find evidence in favor of a more is less phenomenon. The mean dealer bid in the 10-card auction is $3.20, whereas the mean bid decreases to $2.70 for the 13-card bundle. While I find that these bidding distributions are not statistically different from one another at conventional levels via a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (z = 0.84) and a large-sample t-test (t = 0.84), the observed difference of more than 15 percent is noteworthy.
Yet, when the bundles are juxtaposed, statistically significant differences are found. In treatment J, I observe mean bids of $3.09 and $3.45 for the 10-and 13-card bundles. Using both a matched-pairs t-test and a Wilcoxon signedrank test for matched pairs, I can reject the null hypothesis that bids in the 10-card auction are derived from the same parental population as bids in the 13-card auction at the p < 0.01 level (t = 3.73). This result also holds when I examine data from treatment C: although the sample is small, it is readily apparent that dealers opted for the 13-card bundle significantly more than they chose the 10-card bundle.5
As previously mentioned, while these data are the first to document the more is less preference reversal in an actual market with real 5 Although analysis of the raw data provides consistent evidence in support of preference reversals, there has been no attempt to control for other factors that may affect the individual bidding level. These other subject-specific factors, which include years of trading experience, gender, income, education, and age, can be adequately accounted for in a well-specified econometric model. To condition on these factors, I estimated the following bid regression model: bid = g(a + fX); where X includes subjectspecific variables that may affect the bidding level. 
III. Conclusions
The theory of riskless choice assumes that economic agents have consistent and well-6 A companion explanation for the data observed in this study is one of imperfect observation. In this case, an agent uncertain about the value of the goods produces a range rather than a point estimate of value when evaluating the goods in isolation. When presented with the 10-card bundle the range is smaller than that of the 13-card bundle. Under certain assumptions, this theory, which was graciously offered by the editor, can organize many of the findings herein. Overall, these empirical results should have practical significance for economic theorists, empirical researchers, policy makers, and the growing body of scientific research that uses experimental methods. For example, these findings should lend new insights into nonexpected utility resolutions to paradoxes of choice. And, in light of the empirical evidence herein, rather than accepting that dichotomous choice questions are the preferred method to value nonmarket goods and services (as proposed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's blue-ribbon panel, which included Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow), a closer examination of the various nonmarket valuation methodologies seems apropos. Besides this perhaps narrowly focused policy-based example, these results may have sharp implications for a broad array of issues-e.g., potential resolutions of disputes, sorting of employees into respective jobs, the structuring of optimal welfare benefit plans, social security reform, and several other governmental spending and revenueraising programs.
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APPENDIX A: SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS FOR RANDOM nTH-PRICE AUCTION
Welcome to Lister's Auctions. You have the opportunity to bid in an auction for the goods on the table. The number of auction participants, denoted "n" below, will be determined by how many subjects choose to participate in the auction during this sportscard show. Auction Rules: You are asked to submit one bid. Since there are n -1 other bidders, there will be a total of n bids submitted. The monitor will rank these n bids from highest to lowest and the winning bidder(s) will be determined in a random fashion. Here is how it works: if the monitor randomly selected the bid ranked #20 (the 20th highest bid), then each of the 19 bidders who bid more than this bid would win in the auction and receive the goods after they sent me the value of the 20th highest bid. There is an equal chance that the selected bid will be the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th,... or nth highest bid. Lets go through a few examples so you understand the auction rules.
Assume that the randomly determined bid is the 8th highest. I will rank the bids from highest to lowest to determine the winners. 
